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US Foreign Trade Zones as the Secret Lover: Is Uncle Sam Faithful to
Tariff Elimination?
RICHARD J. SMITH
School of Social Work, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI 48202, USA

Abstract
For centuries the nations and principalities of the world have engaged in trading schemes to boost exports. Conquest, protection of domestic supply through tariffs and eroding domestic currency are all part of the historic policy harem. The United States has a foreign trade zone program. Who knew? FTZs evoke images of women
locked inside a dark sweatshop in a jungle making hoodies for football fans. While these "developing" countries
have unambiguously embraced FTZs as an export strategy, Uncle Sam has played the unwilling suitor to the concept,
making the FTZ a common law revealed preference while engaged with but not quite married to tariff reduction.
This essay will compare the US program to its international counterpart and discuss the social policy implications on
the US labor force.
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Activists and scholars debate the utility of globalization
and free trade. While much attention is given to the social
and economic consequences of large trade treaties such as
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the
less well known and perhaps more important Foreign
Trade Zone (FTZ) policies also deserves analysis by scholars of social development. If the Free Trade Agreement is
the faithful betrothed, the Foreign Trade Zone is the mistress. Why buy the cow if you can have the milk duty free?
This paper will summarize the literature about FTZs internationally and use debates in the literature to inform the
FTZ program in the United States. Next, I use a combination of content analysis of newspaper and business trade
press, websites and interviews with experts to determine if
the US program is delivering the benefits of exports and
jobs. Then I summarize what administrative and legislative
options exist to ensure that workers, their families and
communities share the benefits of the FTZ program. The
paper concludes with implication for organizing, policy
and research.
RESEARCH METHODS
The primary research method is a policy analysis using the
criteria of efficiency and friendliness to the wellbeing of
workers, their families and the community. Arguments
presented in this paper are the result of a review of scholarly literature, archival and web based information, newspaper and magazine articles and interviews with staff of 12
foreign trade zones, the U.S. Foreign-Trade Zones Board
and representatives from four labor unions.

FOREIGN TRADE ZONES IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
Free trade has been used since 400 BCE to stimulate trade
and economic growth (Avery, 2003). Three theoretical
perspectives in the literature discuss the free trade phenomena generally and FTZs specifically.
Definitions of FTZs used by World Bank and International Labor Organization include four kinds of trade related zones: 1) the export processing zone (EPZ) which consist of a secure industrial park where goods are manufactured for export under special tax, custom and labor advantages; 2) the special economic zone (SEZ), which also
have a manufacturing orientation but at a larger scale with
a regional development focus that attempts to stimulate
domestic participation in the supply chain; 3) the firm specific zone (FSZ), which are private firm level manufacturing facilities such as the maquiladoras in Mexico, and 4)
the Freeport which are import oriented warehouse on ports
often in developed countries. The United States FTZ program is most similar to a firm specific zone and has a
bonded warehouse program that matches a Freeport scenario (Papadopoulos & Malhotra, 2007). Most of the FTZs
discussed in this paper outside of the United States are
EPZs and are the type of FTZ that has captured any popular imagination. That being said, it is a puzzle if not a curiosity as to why the United States, one of the wealthiest
export oriented economies would need a special program
to promote free trade and exports?
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The literature on trade offers some insight into the
puzzle. Chen (1994) identifies three perspectives: 1) the
neoclassical economic perspective which would predict
that in general any reduction in trade barriers should have a
mutually beneficial effect for both parties in that the market would create an equilibrium based on the comparative
advantage along factor inputs; 2) the state oriented view
argues that a strong state can overcome any negative externalities of the market and direct the economy towards economic growth; and finally 3) the dependency theorists,
who are the critics of export processing zone and globalization in general. Dependistas argue that these are areas of
exploitation of the host by global interests that lead to the
erosion of labor rights and environmental exploitation. A
thorough discussion of these perspectives is not possible in
this paper. First, I will discuss the predictions of macroeconomic theory on the impact of the FTZ in a developing
country, then move on to select critical histories of FTZs
internationally that are influenced by dependency theory.
Macroeconomic Models for Developing Countries:
FTZs, National Income and Labor
For the neoclassical, or neoliberal perspective on FTZs,
picture Bono and his macro-tutor Jeff Sachs on an African
safari with bureaucrats from the US and World Bank in an
attempt to put a human face to poverty. Indeed, in The End
of Poverty, Sachs (2005) argues that FTZs have been critical in reducing poverty by attracting foreign direct investment to create jobs in export oriented industries. For Sachs,
development works, provided that macroeconomic analysis
is carried out with the loving care of a pediatrician.
Macroeconomists have tried to determine in theory
how an FTZ would impact national income and labor. It is
important to note that these models have not been tested
using actual data. The scenario typical in developing countries is a situation called Harris-Todaro unemployment
where high rural unemployment results in rural to urban
migration and an oversupply of unskilled urban laborers.
For example, Young and Miyagiwa (1987) argue that duty
free zones increase national output in countries that have
Harris-Todaro unemployment provided these include a
tariff reduction on intermediate goods intended for resale
of a raw material. Later, they argue that an optimal approach would keep wages low, tariffs high, place FTZs in
rural areas to reduce migration to urban areas and use taxation to invest in human capital (Young, 1991; Miyagiwa,
1993).
Beladi & Marjit (1992) on the other hand, predicts that
a growing FTZs that imports goods that require large investment of machinery, equipment or property, will create
a welfare loss for a country with a protected domestic industry and fixed prices because labor will move away from
labor intensive domestic industry and capital intensive industry will overproduce goods that people do not need.
Others also disagree (e.g. Chuddar & Adhikari, 1993; Basu,
1996).

In short, although the intuition behind a neoclassical
approach would say that free trade promotes social welfare,
those who have modeled scenarios that incorporate the
complexities of rural-urban disparity, labor-capital factor
input trade offs and political will point out areas where the
wrongly structured policy can have a drain on national
income or increase unemployment. Since these models that
assume relevant to developing countries, how would we
apply them to the United States, which already has an equilibrium between rural and urban employment? In the US,
labor and capital are very mobile within the country and
we will see that the FTZs are also mobile—that is to say,
the costs of developing an FTZ is mostly a soft costs with
any fixed property improvements for additional security.
Accordingly, there should be equilibrium between the costal and inland FTZ locations as they compete and collaborate in a supply chain for real estate. Since the US FTZ
does not provide regulatory relief for the minimum wage
or other labor standards, from the perspective of the worker,
it should not be a less desirable choice. In short, after the
fixed costs of operating a special customs regime are incurred, any increase in exports should go into national income and also produce jobs. However, this begs the question of the neoclassical intuition: if free trade is so good,
why not do it wholesale instead of zone by zone? A return
to the political economy will help explore this question
further.
The Memory of the Dependistas: FTZ Political Economy and Labor
Dependency theorists and their stepchildren, the world
systems theorists would argue that it is the export processing zone as a piece of the military and global economic
system that prepares workers, particularly women, to become migrants to work in global cities in developed countries. Papadopoulos and Malhotra (2007) offer a “macromarketing” perspective that injects the political economy
into the global supply chain. They argue that any failures
of the EZP are failures of the state, firm or relationship of
the policy variation to its host country national regulatory
context and not the concept itself. This approach fits into a
state centered model of development.
For example, Rondinelli (1987) found that newer
FTZs in India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and
China had not yet benefited from the program in the ways
that established zones in Asian Tiger states such as Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea. These newer
FTZ countries had high costs of development, dependence
on international firms, rural to urban migration, isolated
enclaves and the creation of a mostly female, unskilled,
low wage work force that risk being cut as international
prices and tariffs change. Rondinelli recommended linkages with domestic firms, technical assistance, regional planning and a domestic enterprise zone program for local
firms in order to address shortcomings in implementation.
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For an example of a dependency argument, Safa (1997)
documents the role of women in FTZs in the Dominican
Republic. FTZs grew in the 1980s as the country shifted
from an import substitution strategy, which involved protected domestic industry to replace imports, to an export
economy based on the comparative advantage of low cost
labor. As a result, female labor force participation increased as mostly high school educated women worked in
textile plants. Initially considered women’s work, men
joined only after factories had a need for work on heavier
garments. Low wages and poor working conditions led to
union activism and in 1992, with support from the United
States, the Dominican Republic passed a law to protect
collective bargaining rights for workers in the FTZ.
In a similar article, Casperez refutes the theory that the
neo-liberal economic order has signaled the end of history
given the resistance of unions to FTZ polices. As FTZs
grew in Asia in the 1970s and 1980s, many Asian countries,
such as Thailand, Korea and India restricted union activity,
specifically strikes. Sri Lanka, more socialist in orientation,
allowed strikes in FTZs. Malaysia promoted FTZs with
wage caps, a 15 year ban on trade unions, low wage female
labor with “nimble fingers.” Factories recruited young
women from rural areas. Strikes were seen as against the
national interest in a growing electronics industry critical
to Malaysia’s growth. The struggle for unionization, according to the author, was not so much from class consciousness but an intersection of nationalism, ethnicity and
gender relations. In a similar vein, Likosky (2003) adds
legal analysis to the case of Malaysia and describes the
evolution of free ports from British Colonialism. These are
examples of a “dual legal order” that create a separate domain from the rest of the country that is responsive to the
needs of international commerce. He notes that Malaysia
attracted Hollywood production companies with a low
wage female workforce that could compete with unionized
California, but could not prevent Malaysian workers from
organizing to demand higher wages. Currently, the FTZ is
complemented with a “Science Park” to attract a high wage
male workforce (Likosky, 2003).
These select case studies from a dependency or world
systems approach show that although FTZs can involve
exploitation of labor, by the same token it also creates a
site of resistance for labor and as Sassen (1998) would
argue, the exposure to international work culture and networks provide opportunities for potential migration flows.
Thus, even for those with a pessimistic framework, there
are still opportunities for hope.
To return to a macromarketing perspective, why would
FTZs flourish in a world that has become the more global
through the reduction of trade barriers through free trade
agreements and supranational entities like the European
Union? Papadopoulos and Malhotra (2007) argue that the
world is not as global as we would like to think and furthermore these EPZs are perhaps the primary way global
barriers are reduced. Indeed, at the end of the day, most
governments, in particular those in developing countries

are rather protectionist. The next section will shed insight
on to why the US developed an FTZ program.
HISTORY OF FOREIGN TRADE ZONES IN THE
UNITED STATES
How then do we explain this peculiar developing world
phenomena in the world superpower? Avery (2003), believes that the FTZs in the US focus primarily on regional
or community economic development while international
FTZs are more narrowly on export promotion and raising
national income. Papadopoulos & Malhotra (2007) argue
that the United States doesn't have a bona fide export processing zone because their FTZs are import oriented. The
data somewhat supports their conclusion. The Foreign
Trade Zone Board Annual Report (2008) documents that
although exports in US FTZ have had a six-fold increase
from $5 billion to over $30 billion; their ratio to foreign
imports has declined from 22% in 2003 to 16%. Papadopoulos & Malhotra (2007) also point out that the FTZ sub
zones in the US are firm specific so they are unlike international counterparts that have a bona fide industrial park.
The US FTZs are a series of warehouses or trade parks
adjacent to a port and the sub zones are ad hoc locations of
designated specific firms. In short, in a world with two
kinds of FTZs, the export oriented and import oriented,
they believe the US maintains an import oriented one. Despite the low ratio of exports to imports in the FTZ, the
original FTZ act made clear its intent to increase exports.
However it was not until the creation of the sub zone before we had a mechanism for allowing manufacturing in
the subzones that we developed a manufacturing component in the US foreign trade zone.
The United States enacted the Foreign Trade Zone Act
in 1934 in response to the high tariffs imposed by SmootHawley, a law signed by President Hoover after the 1929
stock market crash. The political will for more tariffs came
primarily from agricultural states that wanted to protect
farmers from foreign competition (“Smoot-Hawley”, 2008).
The regulations define an FTZ as a “restricted-access site,
in or adjacent to a Customs port of entry, operated pursuant
to public utility principles under the sponsorship of a corporation granted authority by the FTZ Board and under
supervision of the Customs Service” (15 CFR 400.2(e)). A
FTZ must be either within 60 miles or a 90-minute drive of
the outer border of the port. Some satisfy the requirement
by working with Customs to ensure compliance with all
regulations (FTZB 2007).
From 1934 though the 1950s, few firms in the US
took advantage of the FTZ program because of a prohibition of manufacturing in US FTZs (FTZ Corp, 2007). Beginning in 1946, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) brought together 120 nations to negotiate
the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers around the
world. In 1950 the US Congress passed a law allowing
manufacturing in US FTZs on a case-by–case-basis in order to conform to the practice of FTZs in other countries
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and prevent them from gaining a competitive edge. At that
time, goods manufactured in a US FTZ were assessed duty
on the full value added to the product, including domestic
labor, parts, profit and overhead. Consequently, in the
1950s and 1960s few US based manufacturers took advantage of the FTZ program because continuing tariffs on
imported goods still protected domestic industry. However,
as GATT negotiations progressed to lower tariffs on imported goods, the tariff on some finished products became
cheaper than the sum of the tariffs on raw materials used in
manufacturing. This “inverted tariff” regime shifted the
manufacturing advantage for some goods overseas where
tariffs on the raw materials were lower (FTZ Corp., 2007).
Manufacturers and organized labor were unable to raise
tariffs on imports to protect domestic industry. As a partial
solution to the impact of inverted tariffs, the US shifted to
bilateral voluntary quotas. In the case of automobiles, this
only served to drive Japan into higher end markets (Newman & Rhee, 1990). Inexpensive and reliable transportation and the rise of maquiladores in Mexico also drove
manufacturers to produce goods overseas. For eight years,
the National Association of Foreign-Trade Zones (NAFTZ)
lobbied for exclusion of the portion of the value added
manufacturing conducted in a US FTZ from Customs duty
when the good entered the domestic market. In 1980, Customs agreed with this position and US manufacturers in
FTZs were able to exclude domestic parts, overhead, profit
and labor from duty. This served as a major advantage to
manufacturing in FTZs.

chain. In regards to other benefits to the zone user, the
most obvious is cost savings. No duties charged on good
being re-exported. For goods going into the US, duty is
paid when it leaves and none paid if the goods are destroyed or damaged. In FTZs with manufacturing the firm
may pay the inverted tariff, i.e. a rate lower then the one on
imported inputs. US customs streamlines procedures in the
FTZ charging a flat weekly entry fee rather than per shipment (FTZB 2007). As a result, there are at least 250 General Purpose Zones (GPZ) and 450 subzones. GPZs are the
main, multitenant portion of the FTZ while subzones are
single buildings approved for a single purpose such as
manufacturing (ITA, 2007; FTZC 2007). See Figure 1 for a
graphical depiction of the application process.
Public Comment and Denied Applications
After publication of a notice of application in the Federal
Registrar, the FTZ board conducts public hearings and
takes public comment. This is evidence that a member of
the public may use the FTZ approval process to get a concrete action from the FTZ Board, provided that it has the
authority to do it. The FTZ program has many explicit prohibitions and requirements. During audits and compliance
reviews, customs officers are advised to respect “security,
health, safety, and union work rule procedures” as long as
they do not get in the way of the review. The purpose of
these restrictions is to prevent business from circumventing
quotas and tariffs. Accordingly, the FTZ Board restricts
grants of authority with explicit caps on the importation of
these and other goods (USCBP, 2003). Only 12 applications have been denied in the history of the program (Beck,
2006; FTZB, 2007). Two of the notices stated that the project would violate steel import restrictions. The Mani Can
Corporation and Texas City site disapproval notice did not
give a reason other than public interest. One cited imported
sugar as a reason for disapproval. Press clips suggest opposition from a conservationist Nixon appointee for the Portland, MA denial ("Abstract", 1969) and opposition from
the Liberty Union party for a proposed FTZ in Vermont
(Kalil, 2005). A follow up correspondence with FTZB staff
indicated that the parcels denied in the Brattleboro, VT
FTZ were undeveloped with no substantial justification for
their use (Personal Communication, May 4th, 2007).
Local Variations to the Application Process

Fig. 1. Decision Scenarios (A, B, C) for Foreign Trade Zones.

Since 1988 the program changed, US Customs has relied on third party audits and surety bonds for FTZ compliance in lieu costly onsite supervision. The surety bonds
make businesses liable to Customs if they are found out of
compliance. As a result of the savings from onsite supervision, the program became very attractive to firms that
wanted to integrate US based operations in a global supply

Although all FTZs must conform to a standard federal process, there is variation among grantees depending on what
kind of grantee they are and on their internal controls. The
required role of state government is to pass authorizing
legislation to permit FTZ activity in their state. However,
in the case of Hawaii, the Port is also run by the State Department of Economic Development and Tourism, which
acts as the grantee and operator. For the most part, subzone
applicants seek the assistance of a consulting firm
. These firms can help determine if the FTZ status would
be cost effective, prepare the application for the grantee
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and maintain compliance upon award. In some cases, such
as the Port of Oakland, operators provide these services.
They can also determine if it makes more sense for the
grantee to request a subzone or a boundary modification of
the GPZ.
The FTZ board prefers that a firm seeking subzone
status be sponsored by the nearest GPZ, but this is not a
requirement (See Figure 2). Accordingly, less than 20% of
subzones in California are within the same local government jurisdiction as the grantee port/GPZ. Consequently,
only 30% of GPZ sites are within the same local government jurisdiction as the port city. Overall, only about 25%
of all FTZ sites are within the port city limits. The gap between port cities, which have automatic access to GPZ
status, and the actual location of the GPZs is striking and is
driven by Long Beach and Los Angeles, both of which
have limited space inside their ports for the location of a
GPZ and its associated businesses (Personal Communication, April 2007).
California Foreign Trade Zone Sites Inside Port City*
160
140
120
100
In Jurisdiction
Not In Juridiction

80
60
40
20
0
GPZ

SUB

Total

Fig. 2. FTZs Located Within Same Jurisdiction as Port City (*Los
Angeles includes San Pedro and Wilmington FTZs)

Economic Predictors of US FTZ activity, Inputs and
Outputs
In the previous section, I explained the mechanics of the
policy. What does the literature say about 1) the determinants of FTZ establishment and 2) the impact of the policy
on exports and jobs? Friedman (1990) developed a model
to predict which cities would develop a general purpose
zone. She found that cities with international banks increased the probability of GPZ establishment. Another
strong predictor were cities with both port of entry status
by 1965 and economic distress (Friedman, 1990).
Swenson (2000) found that use of US inputs by a firm
declines when the cost of a domestic input is increased due
to a strong dollar. Second, those industries that need foreign inputs make a small reduction in shipments when exchange rates are unfavorable and may make adjustments to
labor, price and sourcing. Mathur (1997) found that that
FTZs had a small effect on exports in the first year of formation and a stronger effect on reexports. He concluded
that the program functioned more as a subsidy to firms

operating in the US and that goods should be treated equally inside and outside the FTZ. Rather than recommend
broader tariff reduction, he listed a series of macromarketing strategies that included public sector marketing, trade
fairs and hands on advocacy from US embassies overseas.
In regards to the choice of location for the US FTZ, Avery
(2003) found that the number of transportation modes
available to an FTZ predicted the volume of FTZ activity.
FTZs that had all four modes of transit—air, water, rail and
highway—had the highest number of active FTZs (97 of
226) and two thirds of those reported activity.
In summary, as noted by Avery, the literature on US
FTZ does not look at the impact on labor, or labor costs as
a factor in making the business decision to locate in a particular place. Accordingly, recent efforts by advocates to
use the program to stimulate jobs do not have a strong empirical ground upon which to make an argument.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
Despite absence of a rich literature on the impact of FTZs
on the lives of working families and their communities, the
policy has grown in utilization. In the case of coastal ports
with large trade volume, there are no vacancies at or near
the port to accommodate interested users of FTZ benefits.
Accordingly, the FTZ program is run as a public service to
the regional economy to bring FTZ benefits to operations
where they are needed. Medium volume coastal ports, such
as the Port of Portland, use the program but are neutral in
how they see it as a benefit (Personal Communication,
April 2007). Inland ports tend to have newer FTZs and are
very enthusiastic about the program’s prospects for economic growth. The FTZ is seen as a must for an economic
development strategy at each airport in the same way all
new housing comes with granite countertops. California’s
central valley and Inland Empire, for example, has seen the
bulk of FTZ formation in recent years (See Figure 3 and 4
for locations of FTZs).

Fig. 3. USA West Coast Foreign Trade Zones
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In short, despite the small evidence base, at the local
and regional level, interjurisdicational competition and
policy diffusion keep the program growing. Unlike its foreign counterparts, the US FTZ may mean more in terms of
outsourcing government compliance efforts, promoting a
regional economic development strategy and improving the
efficiency of the global supply chain through integrated
logistics management. Since an FTZ can almost anywhere,
there is no real geographic targeting. However, there is
clearly an income and information threshold that favors
firms that can afford approximately $100,000 a year in fees
associated with the program.

Fig. 4. California Foreign Trade Zones (General Purpose Zones in
Violet, Subzones in Red)

ENSURING WORKER FRIENDLY POLICIES IN
FTZS
How might local governments ensure that FTZs benefit
workers as well as small businesses? In the case of San
Diego, the City has integrated the FTZ with the state enterprise zone program, which helps recruit and retain a local
low wage workforce (CSD, 2007). The Port of Stockton,
which operates a public port, chooses tenants that provide
“family wage” jobs (Personal Communication, 2007). The
Port’s leverage is based on its role as a landlord, not as an
FTZ grantee. Similarly, San Francisco’s living wage ordinance applies in the FTZ only because it applies across the
whole city. In regards to State action, Hawaii runs the FTZ
as a public facility and sells space by the cubic foot. They
also have a business incubator at the port and handle all
compliance as a public benefit. Thus the Hawaii program
can scale down to meet the needs of small businesses (Personal Communication, May 2007). These models—internal

standard and local ordinance could be replicated according
to the political will of a given local government.
Although only a grantee port can submit applications
to the FTZ Board on behalf of a tenant seeking subzone
status, an interested zone tenant may select almost any port
with which to do business. Therefore, if one FTZ grantee
did not want to do business with a firm whose industry mix
and jobs did not meet its standards, the firm could shop
elsewhere for an FTZ sponsor. This has important implications for social development because even if a policy advocate could work with particular local government entities to establish criteria, including labor standards, for tenants locating in their GPZs it might not be very helpful
because the tenant could always go to another GPZ or seek
subzone status through another grantee that is under the
jurisdiction of another local government.
In regards to existing FTZs, all operators and users
must already comply with all federal and local laws. As a
consequence, it creates a situation where firms that rely on
undocumented workers self select out of the FTZ to avoid
the additional scrutiny by Homeland Security. The security
also makes it difficult for organized labor and labor advocates such as worker centers, church ministries and social
services to have informal access to FTZ sites to ensure
worker rights. However, advocates can prevent designation
prospectively. Mal Harper, Vice-Presidential candidate in
Vermont for the Liberty Union Party, opposed the FTZ
because she believed that it import low wage jobs. She
reported that a book bindery moved from Quebec to the
FTZ to escape union wage rates but went out of business
after a few years (Personal Communication, 2007).
Trade Agreement Parity
In 2008, the quest to make the FTZs a boom to labor took a
step forward when Pascrell (D-New Jersey) introduced
legislation to eliminate tariffs paid by US manufactures in
subzones (“Good Idea”, 2008). Currently, US manufactures must pay tariffs to import intermediate goods but
competitors in countries for which we have a free trade
agreement do not. DeRosa and Hofbauer (2008) argue that
the trade agreement parody proposal introduced in the
House could create 95,000 jobs in the short run. They believe this is true by taking the estimate the impact of
NAFTA on the US economy and applying it to the trade
agreement parody proposal. However they caution about
drawing strong conclusions because of inherent problems
with the gravity model used to derive initial estimates.
However, they provide little justification for the use of
NAFTA from a legal or policy mechanism and how the
impact of the trade agreement parity proposal might be
scaled in magnitude or scope. That being said, the bill if it
passes, will probably add jobs. Since manufacturing jobs in
FTZs in California at least were well above a minimum
wage and often carried benefits, this would indeed be a
family friendly policy. That being said, what of the workers in the warehouses that serve the manufacturing facili-

6	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  DIGITALCOMMONS@WSU | 2009 | Working paper: do not cite or quote without author permission.	
  

FOREIGN TRADE ZONES | R. J. SMITH

ties? Might it serve the public interest to ensure benefits in
secure trade parks that are physically isolated and out of
reach of the pesky union organizer?
CONCLUSION: WHAT IF THE WTO WINS?
Stepping back to the national trend of tariff reduction,
Haveman (2006) of the Public Policy Institute of California
predicts that if the WTO were to find a genie in a bottle
and make all tariffs vanish overnight, California would
have a $27 billion or 24% increase in exports. Why? Asian
countries would have an incentive to buy more goods from
California that they are not already buying more than offsetting predicted declines in purchase from Mexico and
Canada. However, the rest of the United States would not
necessarily see the same growth due to the nature of goods
and existing markets being in the Americas.
Thus, we see in the California case a double bind.
While California as a state would benefit enormously by
tariff elimination, recent investments by local and regional
governments in FTZs in partnership with powerful logistics firms and consultants have created a sizable public
private infrastructure. While these firms play a valuable
role in the current policy framework, will they advocate for
a better tariff structure for all goods? Will the new inland
ports become opportunities for organized labor to replace
aging members? Or has Uncle Sam settled for a comfortable secret lover: nuutz amrag in Mongolian for our new
Asian trading partners and la otra in the language of our
place names.
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